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Abstract 
 
Encompassed by maximization of shareholder value ideology, large US corporations raised corporate 
distributions to record high levels, particularly by share repurchases which provide short-term boosts 
to their stock prices. Since the early 1980s, the deregulation of the US economy and the 
financialization wave provided incentives for companies to direct financial resources towards 
shareholder value instead of innovation and job creation. This study examines the repercussions of 
these trends in the context of Europe. It shows that despite there is a lag in deregulation that helped 
European corporations to establish similar attitudes of shareholder value orientation, large European 
companies have been increasingly focused on corporate distributions to the cost of decreasing 
investment in productive resources and employment opportunities. Although share repurchases 
remained concentrated in a smaller number of companies and they are performed occasionally, 
together with dividends, European companies distribute corporate cash to shareholders as much as 
US companies. Increasing value extraction in Europe in the form of corporate payouts will only 
aggravate the vulnerability of the continent’s economy in the long run. 
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1. Financialization and the European corporation 
 
Extensively studied in the last two decades by scholars from a variety of disciplines, financialization 
became a convenient word to describe the rising importance of any financial tool, measure, motive or 
actor within the functioning of economic activity. There has also been a growing public interest in 
financialization and its negative impact on economic performance since the US-led global financial 
crisis of 2008. 
 
The impact of financialization, which also includes ideological and discourse-based instruments, can 
be extended to any act aiming to reap the returns of any investment through different mechanisms. 
Depending on the extent of power that is to be exerted by a specific economic actor, the benefits and 
the perils of financialization are unequally distributed. The literature on financialization has 
investigated a variety of actors of economic activity including but not limited to institutions, 
households, nations and corporations as creators and users of financial resources. The choice of 
research questions on financialization centers around specific group of actors depending on the 
focus. Where to locate financialization in the operation of the economy, and how it affects economic 
performance (Lazonick, 2011) are the central questions of any research on financialization. 
 
The value extraction that defines financialization depends on a previous period of value creation. The 
massive value creation generated by the US managerial revolution made the United States the 
twentieth-century leader of the world economy (Chandler, 1990). This successful model of 
capitalistic production stumbled, however, with internal problems of conglomeration from the 1960s 
and innovative competition coming from foreign economies, especially from Japan in major 
consumer and capital goods sectors from the 1970s (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Since the 1980s 
the actors in the economy who have been able to extract value have differed from those who create 
value (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). A finance-led growth perspective emerged in response to 
these productivity and profitability questions (Boyer, 2000) with important changes in the internal 
power structure of the firm (Lazonick, 1992; Stockhammer, 2004).  
 
This paper is a part of a research project focused on the financialization at the corporate level with its 
roots in business activity and the structural changes in business organization, employment and 
productive activity since the early 1980s with varying consequences for different actors involved. 
The empirical analysis of the paper is based on the assertion that the roots of financialization can 
only be found within real economic or productive sectors where the value is created and extracted. 
The paper is primarily focused on value extraction through dividend payments and stock buybacks 
performed by public corporations. Excessive value extraction in these forms can undermine the long-
run processes of creating value in business firms and in the economy. The damaging impacts on 
buybacks and dividends on innovation will only become apparent in the future (Lazonick, 2014; 
Lazonick, 2015b). 
 
The significant role of financialization in the US context in the last 40 years and its impact on 
different aspects of economic activity have been deeply researched by a large group of scholars, not 
only restricted to economics. However, in the case of Europe, the discussion has remained limited 
and restricted to national contexts that are not comparable at the continent level. Compared to the 
research on the US and to some extent on the UK, many aspects of financialization in Europe have 
not yet been investigated. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to approach to the issue of the 
financialization of the corporation from a European perspective. 
 
One would expect financialization to be less severe in Europe given the influence of opposing 
institutional and political economic forces of the continent. Any analysis of the historical-
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institutional framework of Europe that also has an impact on transforming corporate strategies is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, although it is the world’s largest economy, the micro-
foundations of financialization have been scarcely studied at the European level. The analysis of 
European transformation towards shareholder value requires concept or action specific research on 
the roots and causes of these transformations in corporate finance and corporate governance. One can 
later identify the interrelations between these themes around a common research framework aiming 
to explore the dynamics of European integration, financialization and corporate transformation. 
Thus, this paper aims to identify the course of value extraction at the corporate level and the 
underlying regulatory changes at European level related to corporate payouts. It seeks to find 
evidence if the prominent aspects of value extraction in the US corporation are also valid in the 
context of Europe and it tries to identify the differentiating aspects of corporate financialization in 
Europe. Together with the research on executive compensation in large European companies (Kotnik 
et al., 2017), this is a first attempt to explore the micro dynamics of continent level transformations 
in corporate activity and their consequences. 
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The context of financialization in Europe 
 
The roots of financialization of the US corporation have been identified by a broad range of studies 
in the last two decades (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Crotty, 2003; Duménil and Lévy, 2004; 
Boyer, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Orhangazi, 2008; Lazonick, 2012; 2014). 
However, the research on the transformation of European finance during the same period has 
remained highly fragmented and the limited number of existing studies which are focused on specific 
elements or countries within Europe are not deep enough to give a clear picture of the impact of 
financialization on European economy. 
 
Indeed, the story of European capitalism in the last quarter of the twentieth century has not been 
extensively written from a political economic perspective which may help us to understand the depth 
and impact of financialization and shareholder value ideology in the following period. Little is 
known about whether financialization at microeconomic level is rooted deep in the 70s and 80s or is 
a more recent phenomenon that began only in the late 1990s. Some early research found limited 
evidence of the infiltration of shareholder value ideology in continental Europe and especially 
Germany (Dupuy and Lung, 2002; Jürgens et al., 2000; Stadler et.al, 2006). The evidence of 
adoption of shareholder-value ideology indicates that it was a modified form of the US version 
incorporating incremental changes through stakeholder consensus resulting in a negotiated form of 
shareholder value orientation (Vitols, 2004) or a slow transition process (Jackson et al., 2005). 
Although such views continued to be endorsed by others (Deeg, 2014), some more recent accounts 
on European financialization stress its impact on rising inequalities, degrading industrial relations 
practices and changing corporate governance mechanisms in favor of a ‘shareholder’ perspective 
(Hein; 2015; Peters, 2011; Prosser, 2014) highlight a fundamental break with the earlier period of 
capitalism, a very similar case to the US. In a similar vein, some other studies also link the full 
establishment of financialization in Europe to the integration of the European Union and the 
introduction of the single currency area, allowing free mobility of financial capital (Eichacker, 2015; 
Rossi, 2013; Nölke, 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, some major issues related to financialization are much less analyzed for Europe. There 
is a research gap in firm-level issues like the role of European-level takeovers and M&As as ‘engines 
of shareholder wealth maximization’; share-based remuneration of executives and employees in 
relation to shareholder value; and the trend of shareholder value distribution in European firms 
during the financialization era. Investigation of such highly interconnected issues is needed for a full-
scale understanding of European corporate financialization. This study is an attempt to push forward 
that research agenda, focusing on value extraction through corporate payouts, and specifically share 
repurchases. 
 
2. Regulatory background of share repurchases 
 
Offered as a solution by economists known as agency theorists to the corporate management 
problems of the day, shareholder-value creation gradually turned into a discursive construct, 
independent of a firm’s productive performance (Froud et al., 2006). Turning into a principle of 
corporate governance first among Anglo Saxon corporations, it also became part of discussion in 
Europe. In 1999, the OECD issued ‘The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ emphasizing 
that corporations should be run, first and foremost, in the interests of shareholders (OECD 1999, in 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) and its similar tone has continued in the 2014-2015 review of the 
principles (Lazonick, 2015a). 
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One major manifestation of shareholder value-oriented corporate governance is the practice of 
corporate payouts, and especially share repurchases. 
 
The first European-level regulation on share repurchases was codified in the Second Council 
Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on 'coordination of safeguards' (EEC, 1977). Aiming to 
establish a common framework for the understanding of shareholder and creditor protection in 
European Economic Community countries, the directive also gave shape to some basic rules of share 
repurchasing in order to prevent any corporate abuse of shareholder and creditor rights. These rules 
included the sources to be utilized, authorization, duration, the interval of price to be paid and 
volume of shares to be repurchased in member countries even if its restrictions were not stringent. 
The directive only concerned the EEC countries where the laws permit a company to buy back its 
own shares. Until the late 1990s share repurchases were either prohibited or very difficult to 
implement due to legal restrictions in most of the Continental European countries. The only country 
which facilitated share repurchases through legislation before the 1990s was the UK. The amount of 
UK share buybacks made up the bulk of total European share repurchase programs (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 2002). In France, Germany and other major European economies, share repurchase was 
made easy to implement or legal only after regulatory changes between 1998 and 2000 (see Annex 
for more details). 
 
Subsequently, in December 2003 the European Commission initiated a new regulation on buy-back 
programs in order to separate them from insider dealing and market manipulation ('market abuse') 
activities which were prohibited by another directive earlier in the same year. In the new regulation, 
share repurchases are regarded as a useful tool in stabilizing markets and market abuse regulations 
should not be applied to buy-back programs (EC Directive 2003/6/EC and EC Regulation 
2273/2003). The regulation defined necessary conditions and restrictions regarding buy-backs to 
provide a safe harbor for companies as long as they observe certain conditions. It was binding and 
directly applicable for member states without any further action on the part of the national authorities 
but the EU member states to establish monitoring mechanisms to provide transparency of disclosure 
in order to prevent abuses. Indeed, sanctions and administrative measures are valid only when the 
competent national authority defines an action as a market abuse. 
 
In April 2014, the previous directives prohibiting insider trading and market abuse within the EU 
were repealed and replaced with an updated EU regulation which entered into force following its 
publication. The regulation was followed with a supplementing text published in early 2016 on buy-
back programs, updating the 2003 directive.  
 
Whether EU level regulation defined the scope of repurchase activity in detail, country specific rules 
still represent a diversity although the EC regulation brought, in some cases, greater flexibility to 
firms having share repurchase activity. Despite existing differences between the US and European 
legislation of share repurchases, repurchase activity in Europe quickly surged upward in 2000s and 
followed a similar trend with the US before the global economic crisis. 
 
The following part provides country level share repurchase information including repurchase 
regulation, tax and insider issues regarding repurchases. The fourth part discusses the limited and 
mostly empirical literature on European repurchases and their findings. In the fifth part, a descriptive 
analysis of the repurchase activity of major European countries is provided for a 16-year period 
starting with 2000. The annex provides detailed information on major EU economies and 
Switzerland about their share repurchase regulations. 
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3. Country specific regulatory information† 
 
France 
 
In France, share repurchases were not illegal before the modification of the law in 1998, but they 
were difficult to implement and the acquired shares could not be cancelled (Ginglinger and L'Her, 
2006). Since 1998, a French company can acquire up to 10% of its outstanding shares within a 
period of 18 months after the announcement of the repurchase program and it can cancel shares or 
reserve them. The regulation was slightly changed in October 2004 to comply with the EC regulation 
and the disclosure period is limited to seven days after the repurchase day, which was the beginning 
of the following month for the repurchases of a given month (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2009). 1998 
Regulation made shareholders' gain of repurchases subject to capital gains tax that companies are 
required to pay a fee of 0.15% of the total value of shares repurchased to the stock market's related 
directorate. According to Dereeper and Romon (2006), right after the regulatory change in 1998, the 
ratio of quoted companies that initiated a repurchase program increased from 8.9% in 1998 to 42.1% 
in 2001 and 324 companies out of 600 companies that have programs performed stock buybacks for 
a net amount of €37.2 billion between 1998 and 2001. During the same period the same group of 
companies distributed €47.8 billion in the form of dividends.  
 
UK 
 
In the UK, share repurchases were legalized by the Companies Act in 1981 with various restrictions, 
a year before the safe harbor promulgation of Rule 10b-18 in the US. A UK company can only 
repurchase its shares during an authorization only valid between two consecutive annual general 
meetings which is usually 12 months and companies must publish their repurchase activity on the 
regulatory news services on the next business day with every detail (Crawford and Wang, 2012). A 
repurchase during an authorization period cannot exceed 15% of total outstanding shares and the 
price to be paid should not be more than 5% above the average price for the five business days 
before the repurchase day (Kim et al., 2003). Moreover, the company has to cancel all the shares 
repurchased. 
 
A major difference with the US, UK companies are prohibited to repurchase their shares during the 
same period when their executives are not allowed to trade in their own shares of the companies. 
Practically, share repurchases are not allowed two months before the publication of annual and 
semiannual earnings and one month before the publication of quarterly results (Rau and Vermaelen, 
2002). 
 
Germany 
 
In Germany, repurchasing shares was prohibited until 1998 when the regulation was changed and 
share repurchases were allowed. German companies are allowed to repurchase up to 10% of nominal 
share capital only with the funds that could have otherwise been paid out to shareholders in the form 
of dividends. Repurchases programs have to be authorized by the annual general meeting of 
shareholders for a maximum period of 18 months and announced to the public (Hackethal and 
Zdantchouk, 2005). Maximum number of shares to be repurchased, minimum and maximum 
repurchase prices, and the method of repurchasing must be declared in the announcement similar to 
the EC regulation. 
                                                 
† For a detailed discussion of the history of share repurchases in the US, see Lazonick, 2012, 2015c 
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Switzerland 
 
Share repurchases in Switzerland started after the revision of the Swiss Corporate Law in 1992 even 
though there was no open ban of repurchases before the revision (Mueller, 2005). Swiss companies 
are eligible to purchase up to 10% of outstanding shares without shareholder approval or any definite 
period of time and price limits. The only restriction concerning a repurchase program is that the 
acquisition of shares must be financed by retained earnings and/or freely distributable reserves 
(Pfenninger and Wyss, 2010). A company can repurchase its shares only ten days prior to the 
earnings announcement and daily repurchases cannot exceed 25% of the average daily volume on the 
first trading line over the previous month. A company must declare the number of shares acquired 
and the price paid per share at the latest on the fifth trading day following repurchase of its own 
shares. 
 
Sweden 
 
Sweden was the last major country in the EU to allow share repurchases. Companies quoted on the 
Swedish stock exchange were allowed to repurchase their own shares beginning with March 2000 
with the usual claims of more flexible capital structures, better use of excess cash or protection 
against hostile take-overs (Peterson et al., 2003). 
 
Although Sweden implemented the EC’s 2003 directive in 2005, the Stockholm Stock Exchange has 
stricter rules on the implementation of repurchase programs and their disclosure. The board of 
directors must announce when they have decided to initiate a share repurchase program and the 
initiation announcements by the Swedish companies are always followed by actual repurchases. And 
according to Swedish law, companies may not engage in trading in their own shares during the 30 
days prior to the publishing of interim reports and companies are required to disclose their 
repurchase transactions on a daily basis (Råsbrant, 2013). 
 
Spain 
 
Spanish public companies can repurchase up to 10% of their shares and hold them as treasury shares. 
Companies are free to reissue these treasury shares in the market or to cancel them through a capital 
reduction (Gonzales and Gonzales, 2004). When the number of shares repurchased is over the limit 
of 10%, the companies are obliged to choose between one of these two options Otherwise the 
acquired shares must be disposed or redeemed within three years after acquisition. The companies 
must create a reserve for the same amount as the repurchase of the securities. Thus, the company’s 
equity is not reduced below the aggregate of the share capital and the non-distributable reserves after 
any repurchase (Hoedl, 2014). 
 
Italy 
 
The legislation on share repurchases in Italy was also put in order in the late 1990s with the changes 
in Italian Civil Code. With minor changes, it was streamlined with the EU directory in 2004. The law 
allows companies to launch repurchase programs only if they purchase fully paid shares and they 
have sources (profits and/or reserves) available as stated by the last approved balance sheet. They 
cannot get loans or give guarantees for the purchase of their own shares except for dedicated 
authorization provided by the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting (Sorge, 2014). The companies can 
sell the shares that were previously bought back as long as the selling of treasury shares has been 
authorized by shareholders. Therefore, Italian companies have the possibility to purchase and sell 
back their shares in the open market without any other formal procedure (De Cesari et al., 2011). 
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The analysis on the regulatory background shows that there is a variety between European countries 
in the implementation of repurchase programs adopted with shareholder approval even though many 
EU countries implemented EC recommendations and directives into their corporate law throughout 
the 2000s. In many countries, the distribution of cash through share repurchase is restricted to the 
available resources in the form of ‘distributable profits’ which establish a direct link between profits 
and corporate distributions in the form of share repurchases that may or may not provide incentives 
for companies to distribute cash to shareholders depending on the company, industry or country level 
dynamics of economic and financial relations among different stakeholders. 
 
3. Mainstream literature on share repurchases in Europe 
 
The literature on share repurchases in Europe is highly limited and most of the studies are re-
applications of the work on share repurchases in the US which is mostly done by mainstream 
financial economists. Research questions of these empirical studies mainly focus on the determinants 
of share repurchases and their results in terms of stock-market valuation. Most of this literature has 
adopted the perspective and tools of agency theory, and they mainly analyze the patterns of share-
repurchase activity across Europe or in specific European countries. Several hypotheses tested before 
for the US companies are reapplied with continent or country-level data and they find evidence to 
support the hypotheses of liquidity (De Cesari, et.al, 2011) or the cash-flow hypothesis that 
companies use repurchases mainly to distribute cash flows in order to reduce agency conflicts (Lee 
and Suh, 2011; Benhamouda and Watson, 2010; Bessler, et.al, 2014). Another group of studies also 
analyzes the stock market reactions to share repurchases in specific countries (Andriosopoulos and 
Lasfer, 2015; Bessler et.al, 2014; Crawford and Wang, 2012; Råsbrant, 2013). 
 
Apart from these papers, only a very small number of studies discuss other aspects of share 
repurchases in Europe. Dereeper and Romon (2006) discuss the relation between dividends and share 
repurchases, and they find evidence that these two are complementary in the case of France with a 
sample of 600 companies quoted on the Paris stock market between 1998 and 2001, contrary to the 
common belief of substitution effect between dividends and stock buybacks. Eije and Megginson 
(2008) study the same relation at the EU level for a longer period between 1989 and 2005 and find a 
similarity with the US that the number of companies paying dividends is decreasing while their total 
dividend payments are increasing that complements the surge in share repurchases, especially after 
2000. They also examine the impact of privatization on payout policies of divested companies, and 
find that these companies account one quarter of the EU dividends and share repurchases while they 
represent less than 2% of the number of quoted companies. 
 
Finally, Ginglinger and Hamon (2009) examine the compliance of French companies with share 
repurchase regulations and document illegal repurchases before earning announcements, with very 
few companies fully complying with regulations. In the most well-known case, right after the 
September 11 attacks, Vivendi bought back its shares worth around $1.2 billion illegally. Later, its 
CEO and some other executives were found guilty, and were given fines and suspended sentences. 
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4. Data analysis 
 
This part discusses the empirical data of corporate financial behavior among largest European 
companies. We analyze the companies of the S&P Europe 350 index in order to directly compare 
them with S&P 500 US companies, another index of the same provider. The index covers around 
70% of Europe’s market capitalization, and the companies constituting the index are among the 
largest European companies. As of 2015, these companies employ more than 22 million people 
around the world. The dataset is comprised of selected financial data of these 350 companies 
between 2000 and 2015, depending on their IPO years. Table 1 provides the information on the 
number of companies in the analysis from the represented countries in the Index. 
 
Table 1: S&P Europe 350 constituents as of January 2016 
Country 
Number of firms in 
the S&P Europe 350 
as of January 2016 
Number of 
firms with IPOs 
before 2000 
Netherlands 19 16 
Switzerland 28 26 
Spain 20 12 
United Kingdom 99 88 
France 48 41 
Germany 38 33 
Finland 9 9 
Denmark 11 9 
Belgium 10 9 
Luxembourg 4 2 
Norway 6 4 
Sweden 24 23 
Italy 19 16 
Austria 3 3 
Ireland 8 6 
Portugal 2 1 
Total 348 298 
Source: Capital IQ and company web sites 
 
The historical data of 298 companies since 2000 allow us to see the trend in major sources and uses 
of funds across these companies during the period. The first figure below show the total amounts of 
selected financials of 298 companies during the period in eurozone inflation adjusted values. The 
second figure provides the growth of these financials as well as total debt, total revenue and 
employment when 2000 is taken as the base year. In the second figure, the negative growth of net 
income and capital expenditures is especially visible. Very moderate growth of total revenues and 
employment is far outstripped by the increase in cash levels, total debt and total dividends of the 
same companies. Big fluctuations of share repurchases before and after the global recession were 
stabilized with a moderate growth at the end of the period compared to 2000. 
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Figure 1: Selected financials of 298 S&P Europe 350 companies, 2000-2015, Eurozone inflation 
adjusted euro values (2015 = 100) 
 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
 
Figure 2: Selected financials of 298 S&P Europe 350 companies, 2000-2015, 2000 = 100, Eurozone 
inflation adjusted euro values (2015 = 100) 
 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
 
The third figure provides the proportion of major uses of funds during the same period for the same 
group of companies. The main visible change is the decrease in capital expenditures with more than 
ten percentage points and an equivalent increase in dividend payments since 2000. The proportions 
of R&D expenditures and share repurchases remained the same‡. The next section details the 
discussion of share repurchases and dividends. 
 
                                                 
‡ The trend in R&D between 2000 and 2015 may not be correct due to inadequate reporting of R&D expenditures by 
European companies in earlier years of the period and before. They may be higher in the early years of 2000s resulting in 
a decreasing trend throughout the period. 
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Figure 3: Proportional values of selected uses of funds of 298 S&P Europe 350 companies, 2000-
2015, Eurozone inflation adjusted euro values (2015 = 100) 
 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports  
 
Figure 4 shows the average levels of corporate payouts and their ratios for the same group of 
European companies. From 2000 through 2015 these 298 companies expended €945 billion on stock 
repurchases, an average of €3.17 billion per company, and distributed a total of €2.88 trillion in cash 
dividends, an average of €9.66 billion per company. Combined, all the 348 companies in the S&P 
350-Europe Index in January 2016 repurchased €64 billion of their own stock and distributed €284 
billion in dividends in 2015, representing 110% percent of their net income. 
 
Figure 4: Payout ratios and average values of dividend payments and stock repurchases of 298 S&P 
Europe 350 companies, 2000-2015, in MM€ 
 
The data are for 298 companies in the S&P Europe-350 Index in January 2016 that were publicly 
listed since 2000. Data for companies that end their fiscal years during the first five months of the 
calendar year are attributed to the previous year. RP, stock repurchases; TD, total dividends 
(common and preferred); NI, net income (after tax before extraordinary items) 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
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The table below shows year-to-year changes in net income, repurchases and dividends of these 298 
companies for the same period to show whether the changes in the payout ratios are driven by 
changes in dividends and share repurchases (numerator) or by the changes in net income 
(denominator). The percentage changes indicate that the net income and payouts are equally 
important to determine the sign of year-to-year change in payout ratios. The underlined percentage 
changes in the net income, share repurchases and dividends show a decisive impact on the change in 
the total payout ratio in that year compared to the previous year. More than two thirds of the period, 
net income had either a positive or negative impact on the payout ratio providing its opposite sign of 
change. In around half of the period, it is the increase or decrease in payouts that define the sign of 
change of the payout ratio. 
 
Table 2: Year-to-year changes in net income and corporate payouts in percentages 
 Net Income Share 
Repurchases 
Dividends (TD+RP)/NI 
2001 -58,9 43,2 18,2 203,1 
2002 -58,4 -17,0 -7,8 114,9 
2003 300,9 -28,5 -6,0 -78,1 
2004 46,0 89,0 16,4 -9,1 
2005 34,2 35,4 25,3 -4,2 
2006 21,5 14,2 27,2 1,1 
2007 4,5 48,5 2,4 11,8 
2008 -51,9 -40,5 8,1 84,4 
2009 13,2 -79,7 -26,2 -47,5 
2010 60,7 125,7 7,7 -26,3 
2011 -11,3 68,0 15,4 40,4 
2012 -12,5 -41,7 -1,2 2,1 
2013 0,7 26,3 12,5 13,8 
2014 8,9 20,8 1,6 -3,7 
2015 -17,1 6,7 9,8 31,7 
 
Beside stock price appreciation to increase capital gains, two main forms of maximizing shareholder 
value are the distributions in the form of dividends and share repurchases. In the last 20 years, 
especially in the United States, share repurchases became ‘systemic and massive’ (Lazonick, 2014) 
and together with dividends they reached more than 90% of net income among large US corporations 
between 2000 and 2015. In Europe, they were also intensified after regulatory changes in late 1990s 
and early 2000s facilitating the share repurchase activity of large European corporations. 
Nevertheless, Figure 5.1 shows that the extent of stock buybacks in Europe is still limited compared 
to the US. Repurchase activity in Europe didn’t recover after the peak years of global recession as it 
has happened in the US. The main form of shareholder value distribution in Europe is common and 
preferred dividend payments as it is shown in Figure 5.2. Shown in Figure 5.3, large European 
companies distribute as much as US companies on average when share repurchases and dividends 
are added together. The widening gap since 2014 can be explained by record high share repurchases 
by large US companies in the last two years of the period and the depreciation of the Euro against 
US dollar during the same period. 
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The last figure (5.4) shows the comparison of total payout as a proportion of net income between the 
US and Europe. For the first time during the period, in 2015 annual total payout exceeded net income 
in a non-recession year on both sides of the Atlantic. This shows the insistence to the shareholder 
value maximization of US and European corporations despite all the criticism they have faced since 
the beginning of the global recession. 
 
Figure 5.1: Average share repurchases of 419 US S&P500 and 298 S&P Europe 350 companies, 
2000-2015, in MM$ 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Average dividends of 419 US S&P500 and 298 S&P Europe 350 companies, 2000-2015, 
in MM$ 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Average share repurchases + dividends of 419 US S&P500 and 298 S&P Europe 350 
companies, 2000-2015, in MM$ 
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Figure 5.4: Total payout (share repurchases + dividends) as a proportion of net income of 419 US 
S&P500 and 298 S&P Europe 350, 2000-2015, in MM$ 
 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
 
In his research, Lazonick (2014) documented an increase in share repurchases of S&P500 companies 
when the S&P500 index is also on the rise during the last two decades. Although the US corporate 
executives claim that they do share repurchases only when the stock prices of their companies are 
undervalued, the data show the opposite. The European data is not different. Figure 6 below shows 
the average dividend and share repurchase expenditures for the 298 companies in the S&P Europe 
350 index in relation to the movement of the index. Both dividends and share repurchases follow the 
same trend with the index and their averages have been increasing during periods of high stock 
prices. 
 
Figure 6: S&P Europe 350 annual average index value and average distributions per company, 
2000-2015, in MM€ 
 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
 
The following table shows the country distribution of corporate payouts of the dataset during the 
same period. The averages per company and per year for each company show that each company 
spent on average around €200 million on stock repurchases and €600 million on dividends each year 
since 2000. In total, these companies on average spent around 77% of their net income on share 
repurchases and dividends during the period. The distributions of companies from Switzerland, UK, 
France, Finland and Italy exceeded the Europe average. In Italy, the ratio was greater than 100% and 
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in the UK, it became very close to the total net income of the companies during the period. While the 
distribution through share repurchases accounts for only around one fourth of the total payouts on 
average, in countries like Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg, share repurchases 
have higher proportions compared to dividends. These are the “repurchase-intensive” countries with 
above average share repurchase to dividend ratios. 
 
In countries like Germany, Netherlands, Finland and Spain, there is a very strong concentration of 
share repurchases that are performed by a very small number of companies. In Germany, Deutsche 
Bank, Siemens and E.ON, the top three repurchasers, constitute around 50 percent of the total share 
repurchases performed by 33 companies of the country in the dataset. In the Netherlands, the share of 
top three (Royal Dutch Shell, Philips and KPN) in total repurchases of the country’s 16 companies in 
the dataset is 53 percent. This ratio for Finland and Spain is 94 and 76 percent respectively. Share 
repurchases are concentrated in a smaller group of largest European companies. 
 
Table 3: Per country average share repurchases and dividends and total share repurchases and 
dividends as a proportion of net income of 298 S&P Europe 350 companies, 2000-2015 
Country # of 
firms 
Average 
repurchase per 
company 
2000-2015 total  
€MM 
Average 
dividend per 
company 
2000-2015 total 
€MM 
RP/NI TD/NI (TD+RP) 
/NI 
RP/TD 
(repurchase 
intensity) 
Switzerland 26 6630 10632 0,31 0,50 0,81 0,62 
Netherlands 16 6487 13647 0,22 0,46 0,68 0,48 
Spain 12 3396 13518 0,13 0,50 0,63 0,25 
United Kingdom 88 3279 9680 0,24 0,71 0,95 0,34 
France 41 3242 10682 0,18 0,61 0,79 0,30 
Germany 33 2694 10507 0,12 0,46 0,58 0,26 
Denmark 9 2569 4539 0,25 0,44 0,68 0,57 
Finland 9 2559 6913 0,24 0,64 0,88 0,37 
Belgium 9 1673 7836 0,12 0,58 0,70 0,21 
Luxembourg 2 1548 3068 0,25 0,50 0,76 0,50 
Norway 4 1247 6306 0,09 0,46 0,55 0,20 
Sweden 23 1129 6148 0,10 0,52 0,62 0,18 
Italy 16 1003 13051 0,07 0,94 1,01 0,08 
Austria 3 770 3327 0,10 0,42 0,52 0,23 
Ireland 6 666 2065 0,12 0,36 0,48 0,32 
Portugal 1 159 7638 0,01 0,57 0,58 0,02 
Total 298 3171 9660 0.19 0.58 0.77 0.33 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
 
The next table shows the distribution of payouts across different industry groups. In a handful of 
industries, the total payout ratios are very close to or exceed 100 percent. Despite heavy losses they 
incur in crisis years, companies in sectors like utilities, telecommunication, technology equipment 
and media kept spending large amounts in share repurchases and dividends resulted in very high 
payout ratios for the whole period. And despite very high amounts of average share repurchases and 
dividends, in sectors like pharmaceuticals, energy and foods & beverages, total payout ratios are 
around the total average due to very high profitability in these sectors. 
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Table 4: Per industry average share repurchases and dividends and total share repurchases and 
dividends as a proportion of net income of 298 S&P Europe 350 companies, 2000-2015 
GICS 
Industry Group 
# of 
firms 
Average 
repurchase 
per 
company 
2000-2015 
€MM 
Average 
repurchase 
per 
company 
per year 
€MM 
Average 
dividend 
per 
company 
2000-2015 
€MM 
Average 
dividend 
per 
company 
per year 
€MM 
RP/NI TD/NI 
(TD+RP) 
/NI 
Automobiles & 
Components 
12 1403 88 6688 418 0,06 0,28 0,34 
Consumer Durables & 
Apparel 
11 995 62 4312 269 0,09 0,39 0,48 
Consumer Services 6 1707 107 5472 342 0,21 0,69 0,90 
Media 12 2162 135 4718 295 0,80 1,74 2,54 
Retailing 4 2845 178 7450 466 0,24 0,62 0,85 
Food & Staples 
Retailing 
9 2062 129 5325 333 0,22 0,57 0,80 
Food, Beverage & 
Tobacco 
15 5524 345 12785 799 0,23 0,53 0,76 
Household & Personal 
Products 
6 4003 250 11824 739 0,16 0,49 0,65 
Energy 13 9336 584 26881 1680 0,17 0,49 0,66 
Banks 27 2457 154 15712 982 0,09 0,57 0,65 
Diversified Financials 12 5972 373 6135 383 0,43 0,44 0,86 
Insurance 16 2494 156 11597 725 0,11 0,52 0,63 
Real Estate 6 416 26 3903 244 0,06 0,53 0,58 
Health Care Equipment 
& Services 
5 627 39 2457 154 0,10 0,40 0,51 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotech & Life Sciences 
13 9755 610 19264 1204 0,27 0,53 0,80 
Capital Goods 38 2087 130 4638 290 0,23 0,51 0,74 
Commercial & 
Professional Services 
12 1031 64 2445 153 0,27 0,64 0,91 
Transportation 12 968 60 4006 250 0,11 0,44 0,54 
Semiconductors & 
Semicon. Equipment 
4 1329 83 1395 87 0,37 0,39 0,75 
Software & Services 4 1532 96 3440 215 0,15 0,33 0,48 
Technology Hardware 
& Equipment 
4 4868 304 8392 525 0,60 1,03 1,63 
Materials 28 1970 123 5205 325 0,19 0,50 0,69 
Telecommunication 
Services 
13 5994 375 24398 1525 0,57 2,30 2,87 
Utilities 16 2827 177 14543 909 0,16 0,81 0,97 
TOTAL 298 3171 198 9660 604 0.19 0.58 0.77 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
 
The last table shows the top 30 repurchaser companies in Europe during the period. Similar to the 
US, oil, ICT, pharmaceutical and financial companies are major repurchasers. A large number of 
these companies have very high total payout ratios. 
 
Even though BP stopped repurchasing its own shares and reduced dividend amounts for a period 
after 2009, it was the biggest repurchaser in Europe during the 16-year period. In 2010, BP caused 
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the largest marine oil spill in history, and the company agreed to pay $20 billion to cover 
environmental damage and other claims by the Mexican Gulf states and local governments. The 
expected court decision of a $20 billion penalty didn’t stop the company from relaunching share 
repurchases in 2013 and increasing its dividend payments even though it stopped repurchases in 
2015 due to a massive loss because of decreasing oil prices and negative net income. 
 
BP is followed by a group of mostly British and Swiss companies in these four major repurchasing 
industries. Another interesting case is Nokia. The company couldn’t compete in mobile devices 
segments and divested its mobile devices business in 2014 after heavy losses in the previous years. 
During the period between 2003 and 2008, when many other companies were getting prepared for 
the technological breakthroughs in mobile devices, the company spent €18.5 billion on share 
repurchases and distributed €9.5 billion as dividends. In the last two years of the period until its 
merger with Alcatel, the company restarted distributing payouts in the form share repurchases and 
dividends and spent €0.6 and €1.9 billion on buybacks and dividends respectively. And in the period 
after the merger, the company didn’t stop its payout activity and spent another €1.1 billion on these 
two forms of payouts in 2016 despite its -€766 million negative income for that year. 
 
Pharmaceutical companies are among the top repurchasers. Although there are only 13 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, representing only 4.4 percent of the S&P350 sample, 
in the top 30, there are five pharmaceutical companies with very high share repurchase and dividend 
figures and three of them are among the top 10. These companies devote between 84 and 96 percent 
of their net incomes in payouts while they continuously argue individually or through their industry 
associations like PhRMA that they need high prices to fund their R&D expenditures. 
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Table 5: Top 30 share repurchasing companies in Europe, 2000-2015 
Rank Company Country 
GICS Industry 
Group 
Total Share 
Repurchases 
2000-2015 
€MM 
Total 
Dividends 
2000-2015 
€MM 
RP/NI TD/NI 
(TD+RP) 
/NI 
1 BP UK Energy 47046 80416 0,29 0,49 0,78 
2 Nestle Switzerland 
Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco 
40779 52663 0,37 0,48 0,85 
3 Novartis Switzerland 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotech. & Life Sci. 
32684 45721 0,35 0,49 0,84 
4 GlaxoSmithKline UK 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotech. & Life Sci. 
32322 62426 0,33 0,63 0,96 
5 Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands Energy 29875 108302 0,13 0,47 0,60 
6 UBS Switzerland 
Diversified 
Financials 
29812 18727 0,89 0,56 1,45 
7 Total France Energy 28484 64851 0,20 0,45 0,65 
8 Vodafone Group UK 
Telecommunication 
Services 
27624 86726 n/a n/a n/a* 
9 AstraZeneca UK 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotech. & Life Sci. 
22740 31644 0,38 0,53 0,91 
10 Deutsche Bank Germany 
Diversified 
Financials 
19455 15263 0,53 0,41 0,94 
11 Nokia Finland 
Technology 
Hardware & Equip. 
19370 20642 0,53 0,57 1,10 
12 Telefonica Spain 
Telecommunication 
Services 
15328 47450 0,24 0,74 0,98 
13 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 
Diversified 
Financials 
15316 14749 0,56 0,54 1,10 
14 BNP Paribas France Banks 15135 29040 0,19 0,37 0,56 
15 Koninklijke Philips Netherlands Capital Goods 14948 6904 0,80 0,37 1,17 
16 Novo Nordisk Denmark 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotech. & Life Sci. 
14268 9397 0,53 0,35 0,87 
17 Siemens Germany Capital Goods 13639 25376 0,21 0,40 0,61 
18 Sanofi France 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotech. & Life Sci. 
12813 32913 0,25 0,63 0,88 
19 Diageo UK 
Food, Beverage & 
Tobacco 
12200 19855 0,34 0,56 0,90 
20 Barclays UK Banks 11743 32982 0,23 0,64 0,86 
21 E.ON Germany Utilities 11547 30190 0,30 0,78 1,08 
22 L’Oréal France 
Household & 
Personal Products 
11306 13541 0,32 0,38 0,70 
23 
British American 
Tobacco 
UK 
Food, Beverage & 
Tobacco 
11049 32126 0,24 0,69 0,92 
24 Rio Tinto UK Materials 10903 24479 0,22 0,50 0,72 
25 Koninklijke KPN Netherlands 
Telecommunication 
Services 
10211 9854 3,09 2,98 6,07 
26 Iberdrola Spain Utilities 10047 10337 0,31 0,32 0,64 
27 BASF Germany Materials 9768 24572 0,20 0,50 0,69 
28 Ing Groep Netherlands Banks 9673 20832 0,14 0,30 0,45 
29 Koninklijke Ahold Netherlands 
Food & Staples 
Retailing 
8685 3391 0,97 0,38 1,35 
30 Daimler Germany 
Automobiles & 
Components 
8237 27693 0,14 0,48 0,63 
*Vodafone’s payout ratios are not calculated due to negative total net income value for the period. 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports 
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Conclusion 
 
This study is a preliminary effort to understand the change in the dynamics of value distribution at 
corporate level in Europe. Preliminary results of the descriptive analysis of value extraction among 
largest European companies show that the trend of increasing payouts, decreasing investment and 
mediocre growth of employment despite the continuing consolidation of industries through merger 
and acquisition, which continue to shape the European landscape of large corporations.  
 
The economic crisis that continues to put strain on European communities, pressure on working 
conditions and increase insecurity across the continent, has had very little impact on the value 
extraction orientation of big corporations that is largely shaped by the maximization of shareholder 
value ideology. Despite stagnant growth or European economies, corporations continued to choose to 
increase payouts and reduce investments throughout the period analyzed. 
 
Given the ongoing rise in inequality and the loss of employment opportunities across the continent, 
the dead end of increasing value extraction in Europe will only aggravate the vulnerability of the 
continent’s economy and will result in a structural impotency to solve ever the growing economic 
and social problems of communities. 
 
Further research on the shift in corporate governance practices including the changes in ownership 
structures, executives’ understanding of the purpose of business enterprise and their disconnection 
from the idea of a social and equitable European economy will help to unveil the root causes of 
rising shareholder value distribution and put the findings of this study in its place.
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Annex 
 
 
Share Repurchase Regulation in the US and Major European Economies 
 
 
Table A.1: Legislation chronology of share repurchases in selected countries 
 
Before the 
major legislation 
First legislation year 
concerning repurchases 
Year of major legislation change 
that facilitates repurchases 
US Legal but with limited use 1934 1982 
France 
Was not illegal but 
difficult to implement 
1998 1998 
Germany Prohibited 1931 1998 
Sweden Prohibited 1975 2000 
Switzerland 
Was not illegal but 
difficult to implement 
1992 1992 
Spain n/a 1989 1989 
United 
Kingdom 
Prohibited by Common Law: 
Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 
1981 1981 
Italy  n/a 1998 1998 
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Table A.2: Repurchase program restrictions 
US Program Approval Board 
Program Period No limit (up to Board’s decision) 
Program Volume No limit (up to Board’s decision) 
Program Price None 
Program Restrictions - 
France Program Approval Shareholder Meeting + COB 
Program Period Maximum 18 months 
Program Volume Up to 10% of outstanding shares 
Program Price None 
Program Restrictions Repurchase cannot exceed retained earnings free from legal or statutory 
commitment 
Germany Program Approval Shareholder Meeting 
Program Period Maximum 18 months 
Program Volume Up to 10% of outstanding shares 
Program Price AGM decision must also include the highest and lowest repurchase price 
Program Restrictions Only funds that could have otherwise been paid out to shareholders in the form of 
dividends can be disbursed for repurchase transactions 
Sweden Program Approval Shareholder Meeting 
Program Period ~12 months (until the next ordinary or extra-ordinary AGM) 
Program Volume Up to 10% of outstanding shares 
Program Price The highest and lowest repurchase price per share should be declared 
Program Restrictions Repurchases can only be made out of distributable profits 
Switzerland Program Approval Board 
Program Period Maximum 3 years 
Program Volume Up to 10% of outstanding shares 
Program Price None 
Program Restrictions The acquisition of the shares must be financed by retained earnings and/or freely 
distributable reserves. 
Spain Program Approval Shareholder Meeting 
Program Period Maximum 18 months 
Program Volume Up to 10% of outstanding shares 
Program Price The highest and lowest repurchase price per share should be declared 
Program Restrictions The issuer must create a reserve for the same amount as the repurchase of the 
securities 
United 
Kingdom 
Program Approval Shareholder Meeting 
Program Period Maximum 18 months 
Program Volume 15% or more of a company’s share capital must be made by a tender offer 
Program Price None 
Program Restrictions Only “distributable profits” or the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares (made for 
the purpose of the purchase) can be used to repurchase 
Italy Program Approval Shareholder Meeting 
Program Period Maximum 18 months 
Program Volume Up to 10% of outstanding shares 
Program Price None 
Program Restrictions The company cannot get loans or provide guarantees for the purchase or 
subscription of treasury shares. 
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Table A.3: Repurchase activity restrictions and disclosure rules 
US Repurchase Period Anytime during the program 
Repurchase Volume The issuer’s purchases on that day do not exceed 25% of the average daily trading 
volume of its shares, except for a purchase of a “block” of shares 
Repurchase Timing The issuer does not affect any purchase of its shares during the final 30 minutes 
(10 minutes for 2 actively-traded shares) before the close of the session in the 
principal market for the issuer’s common stock and in the market where the 
purchase is effected 
Repurchase Price The issuer does not bid for or purchase its shares at a price that is higher than the 
highest independent bid or last independent transaction price, whichever is higher, 
quoted on the consolidated system 
Disclosure Period Quarterly disclosure of all issuer repurchases of shares or other units of any class 
of the issuer’s equity securities that are registered by the issuer 
Disclosure Content Issuers are required to report the total number of shares (or units) purchased 
(reported on a monthly basis), the average price paid per share, the total number 
of shares (or units) purchased as part of a publicly announced repurchase plan or 
program and the maximum number (or approximate dollar value) of shares (or 
units) that may yet be purchased under the plans or programs 
Disclosure Authority Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
France Repurchase Period No later than 15 days before results announcements or if in possession of non-
public information 
Repurchase Volume 25% of the average daily volume traded in the month preceding the month of 
public disclosure of that program and fixed on that basis for the authorized period 
of the program 
Repurchase Timing No purchase may constitute the opening or closing transaction of the current 
trading day 
Repurchase Price The purchase price is lower than the higher of the price of the last independent 
trade and the highest current independent bid on the trading venues where the 
purchase is carried out 
Disclosure Period Within 7 days after the repurchase day and disclose monthly to the public 
Disclosure Content - 
Disclosure Authority Commission des opérations de bourse (COB) 
Germany Repurchase Period - 
Repurchase Volume - 
Repurchase Timing - 
Repurchase Price - 
Disclosure Period Monthly 
Disclosure Content The management board is required to inform the shareholders during the next 
shareholders' meeting of the purpose of the acquisition, the number of shares 
acquired, the amount of the share capital that they represent, the proportion of the 
share capital that they represent, and the purchase price of the shares 
Disclosure Authority Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (BAW) 
Sweden Repurchase Period Firms may not engage in trading in their own shares during the 30 days prior to 
the publishing of interim reports 
Repurchase Volume The company may not purchase more than 25% of the average daily volume 
traded in the month preceding the month of the public disclosure of the repurchase 
program 
Repurchase Timing No repurchase can take place in the last 30 minutes of the trading day 
Repurchase Price The company may not purchase shares at a price higher than the higher of the 
price of the last independent trade and the highest current independent bid on the 
trading venues where the purchase is carried out 
Disclosure Period All trades, with information on the number of shares repurchased and average 
price paid, must be reported to the SSE 
Disclosure Content - 
Disclosure Authority Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) 
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Switzerland Repurchase Period 10 days before earnings announcements or the release of any price-sensitive 
information. 
Repurchase Volume Issuer must not, on the regular trading line, repurchase more than 25% of the 
shares' average daily trading volume (based on the daily volumes of the last 30 
trading days on that trading line) 
Repurchase Timing The issuer must not place repurchase orders during the opening and closing 
auctions, nor during the auction performed after a "stop trading" 
Repurchase Price The premium paid on a second trading line should not exceed 5% of the price 
prevailing in the stock market at the same time 
Disclosure Period On the first trading day after the end of the offer period, the issuer must report the 
total number of shares repurchased in each category and disclose them every 10 
trading days 
Disclosure Content - 
Disclosure Authority The Swiss Takeover Board (TOB) 
Spain Repurchase Period - 
Repurchase Volume In an amount, up to 25% of the average daily trading volume in its stocks 
Repurchase Timing - 
Repurchase Price Price not higher (lower, in case of sales) than the highest (lowest, in case of sales) 
independent published bid or last independent transaction price  
Disclosure Period Companies have to notify the Stock Exchange of all repurchases that represent at 
least 1% of the firm common stock before seven days following the repurchase 
Disclosure Content - 
Disclosure Authority Madrid Stock Exchange 
United 
Kingdom 
Repurchase Period Companies are not allowed to buy back shares during periods when officers and 
directors are not allowed to trade in their company’s shares. In practice, this 
means that share repurchases are not allowed in the 2-month period preceding the 
publication of annual earnings or semiannual earnings and in the 1 month before 
the publication of quarterly results. 
Repurchase Volume - 
Repurchase Timing - 
Repurchase Price Not more than 5% above the average of the market value of those shares for the 
10 business days before the repurchase is made 
Disclosure Period According to UK Listing Rules, once repurchases are made, these too must be 
reported to the UKLA as soon as possible or no later than 7:30 AM on the 
following business day. 
Disclosure Content The report must include the date of purchase, the number of equity shares 
purchased, and the highest and lowest purchase prices in a day. 
Disclosure Authority Financial Services Authority 
Italy Repurchase Period - 
Repurchase Volume The daily volumes do not exceed 25% of the average daily trading volume 
registered on the six months preceding each relevant trad 
Repurchase Timing - 
Repurchase Price The purchase price should not be higher than the last price of the day before 
Disclosure Period Monthly 
Disclosure Content - 
Disclosure Authority Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob) 
 
